Mercer Law Review
Volume 58
Number 3 Symposium: Using Metaphor in Legal
Analysis and Communication

Article 14

5-2007

Testimonial? What the Heck Does That Mean?: Davis v.
Washington
Lindsay Brewer

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Brewer, Lindsay (2007) "Testimonial? What the Heck Does That Mean?: Davis v. Washington," Mercer Law
Review: Vol. 58 : No. 3 , Article 14.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol58/iss3/14

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Casenote

Testimonial? What the Heck Does That
Mean?: Davis v. Washington

I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2004 United States Supreme Court decision in Crawford v.
Washington1 reformulated the standard for determining when the
admission of hearsay' statements in criminal cases is permitted under
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment3 to the United States
Constitution. The majority held that the Confrontation Clause operates
to exclude out-of-court statements that are "testimonial" in nature,
unless the person making the statement is unavailable to testify and the

1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2. This Casenote discusses only the implications of the Confrontation Clause and the
admissibility of a certain category of hearsay: testimonial hearsay. This Casenote does not
analyze the other rules against hearsay and the exceptions to those rules that also operate
to exclude or allow out-of-court statements made by a person other than the person

testifying. Where out-of-court statements are not testimonial, the Confrontation Clause
is not implicated, but the rule against hearsay can operate to exclude those statements that
do not fall into a firmly-rooted hearsay exception. See H. Patrick Furman, Crawford at
Two: Testimonial Hearsay and The ConfrontationClause, 35 MAY COLO. LAW. 47 (2006).
3. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
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defendant has hadan opportunity for cross-examination.4 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who concurred in the judgment, expressed concerns that the
decision would lead to uncertainty in future criminal trials because the
Court did not provide a definition of "testimonial."5 Davis v. Washington6 and its companion case Hammon v. Indiana' comprise the
Supreme Court's attempt to begin shaping a workable framework for
determining whether an out-of-court statement is "testimonial" or
"nontestimonial." In Davis and Hammon the Court addressed the issue
of whether certain types of statements made to law enforcement officers
or personnel are "testimonial" and thus subject to the Confrontation
Clause.8
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
9

In Davis v. Washington, the defendant, Adrian Davis, was charged
with a felony for violating a domestic no-contact order that prohibited
him from contacting his ex-girlfriend and petitioner in the case, Michelle
McCottry. In support of its case against Davis, the State presented the
testimony of two police officers who responded to a 911 call that
McCottry made. These police officers could only testify that they
observed that McCottry had injuries that looked recent and could not
testify that Davis caused these injuries. McCottry did not appear at the
trial, and the State's only evidence supporting Davis's guilt in causing
the injuries was the transcript of the 911 call in which McCottry stated
that it was Davis who hit her."° Davis objected to the entry of the
transcript on the grounds that it violated the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause, but the trial court admitted it anyway, and a jury
convicted Davis. 1 The Washington Court of Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the outcome, reasoning that the portion of
the 911 transcript that contained McCottry's identification of Davis as
the person who attacked her was not testimonial and therefore not
subject to the Confrontation Clause. 2 The United States Supreme
Court affirmed. 3

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54.
541 U.S. at 75 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006).
Id. at 2270.
126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006).
Id. at 2271.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2280.
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In the companion case, Hammon v. Indiana,14 Hershel Hammon was
charged with domestic battery and a probation violation resulting from
a domestic disturbance with his wife, Amy Hammon. The main witness
in the case, Amy Hammon, did not appear at trial, and the State relied
on the testimony of a police officer who responded to the disturbance and
had taken a written affidavit of Amy's recollection of the events. The
State asked the police officer to testify about Amy's statements on the
night of the incident, and Hershel's attorney objected to the State's line
of questioning on the grounds that there was no opportunity to crossexamine Amy. The police officer testified that Amy told him that during
the course of an argument between herself and Hershel, Hershel had
thrown her into some broken glass. The trial court allowed the
testimony, noting that Amy's oral statements were permissible under a
firmly rooted exception to the rule against hearsay, but the trial court
did not address whether the statements were testimonial. 5 The judge
in the trial court found 16Hershel guilty of both the domestic battery and
the probation violation.
Both the Indiana Court of Appeals and the Indiana Supreme Court
affirmed the relevant parts of this decision, upholding Hershel's
conviction and holding that Amy's oral statements were not testimonial.
The oral statements were admissible because they fell under a firmly
rooted exception to the rule against hearsay. The Indiana Supreme
Court further held that the written statements in the affidavit were
testimonial and should not have been admitted, but that admission was
harmless. 7 The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
holding that Amy's written statements in the affidavit were testimonial,
and therefore the Confrontation Clause required that the affidavit be
excluded unless the defense had an opportunity for cross-examination.'"
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him."' 9 In Dowdell v. United States,2" the Supreme Court
noted that the Clause prohibits any testimony by witnesses that does not

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
Id. at 2272-73.
Id. at 2273.
Id.
Id. at 2280.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
221 U.S. 325 (1911).
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allow the accused to be face-to-face with the witness and able to crossexamine the witness.21 However, the Court noted that there are
several exceptions to the literal language of the Clause, stemming from
public policy and necessity.22
The Confrontation Clause is Set Aside: 1980 - 2004
In Ohio v. Roberts,23 the Supreme Court discussed the Confrontation
Clause and whether it was constitutionally permissible for witness
testimony from a preliminary trial to be admitted at the later trial
where the witness was not present.2 4 The Court reevaluated the
relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the basic rule
against hearsay evidence and its many exceptions. 25 The Court noted
that hearsay evidence is defined as "'testimony in court, or written
evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered
as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus
resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-[court] asserter.'" 26 The Court concluded that the Confrontation Clause operates to
exclude some hearsay evidence 27 and works with the rule against
hearsay to safeguard the criminal justice system in that there is greater
accuracy in the fact-finding process where witnesses are subject to crossexamination at trial.28 This greater accuracy comes from (1) the
reluctance of witnesses to lie against someone present at trial, (2) the
punishment of perjury for lying under oath, and (3) the crossexamination's ability to sift through the truth of the recollection. 2' The
Court indicated that the right to confrontation was a traditional part of
trial that contributed to the meaningfulness of the proceedings.3s
The Court also noted that there are other interests that may override
the necessity of confronting witnesses at trial.3 1 Under Roberts, the
Court's general approach to determine how the Confrontation Clause
works to limit the admissibility of hearsay evidence consisted of two
A.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
1972)).
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 330.
Id. (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895)).
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Id. at 58.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 62 n.4 (quoting E. CLEARLY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 246, at 584 (2d ed.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 63-64 n.6 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
Id.
See id. at 63-64.

31. Id. at 64.
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separate tests. 2 First, the prosecution must meet the rule of necessity
and show that the declarant whose testimony it wishes to introduce is
unavailable for trial.'s To show that a witness is unavailable for trial,
the prosecution must show that it made a good faith effort to get the
witness to court.34 In Roberts the Court held that the prosecution
satisfied its burden in showing that the witness was unavailable because
it subpoenaed her five different times at her parents' address, and
learned from her parents that they had unsuccessfully tried to locate her
for over a year. 5
Second, once the prosecution shows that a witness is unavailable, it
must demonstrate that the testimony it wishes to introduce is reliable
by meeting an indicia of reliability." This reliability test is intended
to guarantee that the written evidence presented is trustworthy. 7 The
Court evaluated the reliability of the witness in Roberts by comparing
the facts to California v. Green,3" a case in which a witness claimed to
have forgotten an earlier statement that he offered in a preliminary
hearing, identifying the defendant as a drug supplier, and the prosecution attempted to introduce into evidence the transcript from that
preliminary hearing. 9 Generally, the evidence meets this requirement
when it falls within one of the "firmly rooted hearsay exceptions" or
when it bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."4 °
In Green the Court held that the statements made at the preliminary
hearing were admissible and satisfied the Confrontation Clause because
they were given in a setting where the witness was represented by
counsel, and there was an opportunity to cross-examine. 4 The Ohio
Supreme Court determined that the statements were reliable even if the
witness was not actually cross-examined, so long as there was an
opportunity to do SO. 4 2 The United States Supreme Court did not
decide this issue because there was evidence that the declarant was
cross-examined at the preliminary hearing, and therefore, the statements were reliable.4 3

32.
33.
34.

Id. at 65.
Id.
Id. at 74 (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968)).

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 75.
Id. at 65-66.
Id.
399 U.S. 149 (1970).
Id. at 151-52.
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 71.
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Also, the Court in Roberts, following the logic in Green, based a large
portion of its analysis on the purposes behind the Confrontation Clause
and noted that even if the literal language is not satisfied, the Clause's
requirements are met where the purposes are satisfied." Further, the
Court declined to evaluate the actual reliability of the declarant's
statements, holding that because counsel was afforded an adequate
opportunity for cross-examination, there was sufficient reliability.45
The Court's purpose-oriented application of the Confrontation Clause
in Roberts noticeably weakened the literal right to Confrontation.
Moreover, the rules against hearsay and the exceptions to those rules
essentially swallowed the Confrontation Clause. The prosecution had
little barrier to the introduction of testimony where the witness was not
at trial and not subject to cross-examination. Under Roberts, the
prosecution only had to show that it had made a good faith effort to find
the witness for trial to satisfy its burden of showing that the witness
was unavailable.4 6 Further, it was not necessary for the accused to
have the actual opportunity to cross-examine the witness, so long as the
testimony was found to be reliable, a seeming departure from the literal
language requirements of the Confrontation Clause.4 7 The Confrontation Clause continued to receive this dismissive treatment until the
Supreme Court revisited the issue in 2004.
B.

The Confrontation Clause Re-emerges in 2004

On March 8, 2004, the United States Supreme Court revisited the
Confrontation Clause issue in Crawford v. Washington,' and expressly
overruled the decision in Roberts.49 The Court reformulated the
standard for determining when the admission of testimonial hearsay
statements in criminal trials is permitted under the Confrontation
Clause and held that the reliability standard from Roberts was
unreliable and unpredictable."
In Crawford the defendant, who was charged with assault and
attempted murder for allegedly stabbing a man, claimed self-defense at
trial. The defendant's wife invoked marital privilege and did not testify,
so the prosecution played a tape-recorded statement that the wife had
given on the night of the incident. The recording was contradictory to

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 66, 74.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 68.
Id. at 63.
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the defendant's contention that the stabbing was in self-defense. In the
lower court, the State was successful in introducing the recording into
evidence because it bore an "adequate 'indicia of reliability'" and was
trustworthy.5
The defendant objected to the admission and attempted to invoke the
protection of the Confrontation Clause as it was understood in Roberts.52 The defendant was convicted, but the conviction was overturned
by the Washington Court of Appeals, which applyied a nine-factor test
to determine the reliability of the statement. The reasons given by the
Washington Court of Appeals for the reversal included: (1) many of the
statements on the, recording contradicted one another, (2) the witness
said she may have closed her eyes, and (3) it was a recording of a very
specific, question-driven interrogation.53 Also, the prosecution argued
that the statements were reliable because both the defendant's story and
the wife's story were "'interlocked'" and recounted the same events
leading up to the stabbing.5 4 The court of appeals rejected this
argument because the central issue-whether the stabbing was in selfdefense-was the point where the statements diverged. The Washington
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the
defendant's conviction. 55
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to revisit the
issue of whether certain out-of-court statements can be admitted into
evidence without a cross-examination of the person who made the
statements.56 The defendant argued that the Roberts reliability test did
not reflect the Framers' intention for the Confrontation Clause and
asked the Court to reconsider the issue.57 The Court first looked to the
text of the Constitution, but as noted in Roberts, the literal language of
the Confrontation Clause does not fully explain the way it should
operate in practice.55 Instead, the Court analyzed the history and
purpose for the Confrontation Clause and observed that early in the civil
law system, there was a tendency for abuse when witnesses were not
required to come face-to-face with those that they accused.5 9 Also, the
literal right to confront those that accuse a person of a crime is a right

51.
52.
53.

Id. at 38, 40.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 43.

Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
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that has been in existence since Roman times.6' Because of the
historical importance of the right, and in response to the abuses, early
courts tightened application of the doctrine.6' The Court noted that
historically, the main purpose of the Sixth Amendment was to prohibit
ex parte witness examinations-those that did not notify the defendant
or allow him to rebut-from being admitted as evidence against the
defendant.62
Importantly, the Court pointed out that the Confrontation Clause only
applies to witnesses who "bear testimony" against the accused because
only testimonial hearsay statements are subject to its requirements.6 3
The Court then discussed what identifies a statement as testimonial and
thus subject to the Confrontation Clause.'
The Court declined to
provide a complete definition of testimonial and instead provided
minimal guidance for the application of the reformulated doctrine.65
First, the Court stated that formal written statements that are given
with the reasonable expectation that they will be used in the prosecution
of a criminal are clearly testimonial." Also, the Court noted that
formal police interrogations are considered to be testimonial because
they are "essentially investigative and prosecutorial."6 7
Next, the Court noted that the Framers intended the Confrontation
Clause to prohibit testimonial statements to be admitted as evidence
where the person who made the statements is not present at trial, unless
that person is shown to be unavailable, and the defendant had an
opportunity for cross-examination.6 So, where a statement is shown
to be testimonial, and the defendant does not have the opportunity to
cross-examine the witness who made the statement, the Confrontation
Clause operates to exclude that statement from the trial. Unlike the
Court's decision in Roberts, the Court in Crawford decided that the
ability to cross-examine was a dispositive
factor and could not be
69
satisfied by a showing of reliability.

In overruling Roberts, the Court said that the test for reliability did
not reflect the history and purpose behind the Clause discussed above
in two respects: (1) it was too broad in that it did not distinguish

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 51.

64. Id.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id. at 51, 68.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 53-54.
Id. at 55-56.
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between testimonial and nontestimonial statements, and thus treated all
hearsay the same, and (2) it was too narrow in that some ex parte
testimony was admitted when shown to be reliable.7" Therefore,
according to the Court, the test was too flexible and did not always
adequately protect the right to confrontation.7 1 The Court rejected the
Roberts indicia of reliability standard and held that testimonial
statements can only be admitted into evidence where the defendant is
given the ability to cross-examine the declarant.7 In his concurrence,
Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority's decision to leave out a
comprehensive definition of testimonial and noted that prosecutors
would be burdened by this deficiency.73 The Court began to provide
some guidance in its 2006 decision in Davis v. Washington.74
IV.

COURT'S RATIONALE

Washington7 5

Davis v.
is a follow-up case to Crawford v. Washington 7 6 and analyzes two specific factual scenarios under the Crawford
rule to further clarify what types of statements are testimonial and
therefore subject to the Confrontation Clause. 7 In Davis, the first case,
the Court analyzed whether the transcript of a 911 call is testimonial for
purposes of the Confrontation Clause. 7' The defendant challenged the
entry of the transcript into evidence based on the argument that it was
testimonial, and it identified the defendant as the caller's attacker but
did not afford the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the caller
because she did not appear at trial.79 The Court noted that there are
times when a statement will be subject to hearsay rules but not to the
Confrontation Clause because the statement is not testimonial in
nature.8 0
The Court further noted that when statements are made to police or
law enforcement officials and the purpose of the statements is to enable
the officials to "meet an ongoing emergency," the statements are not
testimonial.8 ' But when the statements are made to establish facts

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 60.
Id.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2270.
Id.
Id. at 2271.
Id. at 2273.
Id.
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that will later be used by the prosecution in a trial against a person
about whom they were made, the statements are testimonial.8 2 The
Court then distinguished the facts in Davis from those in Crawford.8"
First, the victim in Davis, McCottry, was expressing facts as they were
happening in an attempt to secure her safety by helping the police
capture her attacker, not recounting facts for use in a later prosecution.' Second, it was clear that McCottry was faced with an ongoing
emergency, unlike the victim in Crawford.8" Also, the 911 operator
asked questions that were necessary to resolve the present emergency,
not to establish facts about the defendant.86 Further, the Court noted,
there is a notable difference in the level of formality in Davis and that
of Crawford.87 In Crawford the statements were responses to structured questions and were tape-recorded in a police station after the
declarant was Mirandized. 8 In Davis, on the other hand, the declarant
was on the phone in her home while hiding from her attacker, frantically
answering questions, not as a witness, but as someone in an emergency
situation. 89
Not only is Davis distinguishable from Crawford, but it is also much
different from any of the early cases in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence because none of those cases involved statements made in an
ongoing emergency.' The Court also noted that portions of the 911 call
could have included testimonial statements if the questioning changed
from the type necessary to resolve the emergency to traditional police
questioning that would be used in the trial against the attacker.9 1
However, the parts of the transcript that identified Davis as McCottry's
attacker did not appear to be after any such transition and thus were
not testimonial.92
In the companion case, Hammon v. Indiana,93 the Court held that
the statements made during the course of Amy Hammon's interrogation
were testimonial and thus subject to the Confrontation Clause.9 4 The

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 2273-74.
Id. at 2276.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2276-77.
Id. at 2277.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
Id. at 2278.

20071

DAVIS V. WASHINGTON

1107

Court noted that the task of determining whether these statements were
testimonial was much easier than it was in Davis because the facts of
Hammon are very similar to those in Crawford.9 5 The interrogation in
Hammon was a line of questioning in which the police officer was trying
to establish whether there was criminal conduct at the Hammon home
earlier in the evening.96 The officer was not obtaining information in
order to address an ongoing emergency.9 7 The police officer did not
Mirandize Amy Hammon like the officer did in Crawford, but the Court
held that this difference is not legally significant to change the character
of the statements from testimonial to nontestimonial.98 Also, the
investigation in Crawford was more formal than in Hammon, but the
Court noted that it was significant that the officer in Hammon took Amy
Hammon into a separate room to conduct the questioning."
In both Crawfordand Hammon, the declarants were forcibly separated
from the person against whom they were testifying, the "statements
[were] deliberately recounted," and the declarants were both responding
to specific questions about potential criminal conduct."° The Court
also noted that there are very significant differences between Hammon
and Davis, most notably that Davis involved a cry for help and Hammon
and that these differences led to different results in the two
did not,
1°1
cases.
The Court also noted that there is not a sufficiently compelling reason
to make the Confrontation Clause more flexible in domestic violence
cases. 0 2 However, according to the Court, if there is a finding that
there was some wrongdoing on the part of the defendant that caused the
witness not to appear at trial-referred to as "forfeiture by wrongdo10 3
ing"-then the defendant loses his or her right to confrontation.
Justice Thomas declined to join the majority opinion and instead
concurred in the Court's decision in Davis and dissented from the Court's
decision in Hammon.' Justice Thomas opined that neither Davis nor
Hammon implicated the Confrontation Clause and that in order to
implicate the Clause there must be more formality in the state-

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2279.
102. Id. at 2279-80.
103. Id. at 2280.
104. Id. at 2281 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

1108

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

ments.0 5 Justice Thomas focused on the historical formality surrounding the Confrontation Clause, which stemmed directly from the Framers'
desire to exclude hearsay testimony that Queen Mary's English bail and
committal statutes permitted.'
Also, Justice Thomas pointed to the
customary use of Miranda warnings to inform a person that any
07
statement a person gives can be used against that person in court.
He stated that this necessary level of formality is not present in "a mere
conversation between a witness or suspect and a police officer.""'8 He
further noted that the Crawford test was workable and closely matched
the language of the Confrontation Clause, but that the Court in Davis
changed that test and made it unworkable and overinclusive.' 9
Thomas claimed that the Court's desire to avoid potential abuse by the
prosecution-purposely avoiding the Confrontation Clause by using
technically informal questioning methods--did not warrant such an
overinclusive test."0 He concluded that neither the 911 call in Davis
nor the police questioning in Hammon was sufficiently testimonial to
warrant the implication of the Confrontation Clause under Crawford."'
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The main implication of Davis v. Washington"' is that it provides
guidance in how the Confrontation Clause operates by attempting to
further define what constitutes testimonial evidence. In two specific
factual scenarios, the Court has begun to outline a balancing test for
determining whether a statement made to law enforcement personnel
constitutes testimony. Also, it provides an example of nontestimonial
statements given to law enforcement personnel. Therefore, prosecutors,
judges, and law enforcement have a larger framework for analyzing
whether testimonial evidence can be constitutionally permitted without
the witness being present at trial and subject to cross-examination.
With Davis and Hammon v. Indiana," courts now have a broader

105. Id. at 2281-82..
106. Id. at 2281. These statutes required a formal oral examination of all suspects and
witnesses within two days and a physical transmission of the statements to the judge
hearing the case without the participation or appearance of the suspects or witnesses (ex
parte examinations). Id.
107. Id. at 2282.
108. Id. at 2282-83.
109. Id. at 2280.
110. Id. at 2283.
111. Id. at 2284.
112. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
113. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
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case-comparison basis for determining whether statements are testimonial or nontestimonial.
Even with the more precise definition of testimonial, prosecutors face
a larger hurdle with the reformulation of the Confrontation Clause test.
As noted in Davis, the Court is not willing to make the Confrontation
Clause more flexible in domestic violence cases." 4 As a consequence
of Crawford v. Washington"5 and Davis, domestic violence cases are
more susceptible to dismissal than under Ohio v. Roberts"r because
the victims are "notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion" and
therefore are less likely to appear to testify in court." 7 Without the
presence of a victim in a domestic violence case, police reports and
written affidavits are not admissible to the extent that they are
testimonial. Without the witness, the reports, or the affidavits, the
prosecution essentially has no case against the defendant. Therefore, in
practice, prosecutors have a much greater burden to ensure that the
victim comes to trial. Further, defense counsel has a much easier road
than before Crawford and Davis because the defendant is very likely to
prevail if the victim does not appear. Also, Davis places a greater
burden on law enforcement personnel because the timing and level of
formality of the questioning are key factors in determining whether the
statements are testimonial or nontestimonial.
Justice Thomas, in his dissent, noted that this increased burden on the
prosecution and law enforcement will result in a lack of consistent
Also, Justice Thomas indicated that the
results under Davis."8
decision in Davis Was too broad and makes many more statements
qualify as testimonial than was intended by Crawford."9 Thomas
further noted that many of the statements that will be barred by the
post-Davis Confrontation Clause interpretation would have previously
been admissible hearsay (statements that are not testimonial do not
implicate the Confrontation Clause and are instead governed by 1the
20
rules against hearsay and the numerous exceptions to those rules).
Davis only defines testimonial hearsay in the narrow category of
statements made to law enforcement, and there are many more
situations that will implicate the Confrontation Clause. Until the Court
defines other types of testimonial hearsay, judges, prosecutors, and

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 2279-80.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279-80.
Id. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting part).
Id. at 2281.
Id.
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defense attorneys will have to use the framework provided in Davis.
The decision is a single step of the many steps necessary for a full
understanding of testimonial for purposes of the Sixth Amendments
Confrontation Clause.
LINDSAY BREWER

